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FAST FOOD, ZONING, AND THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE: WAS IT  
SOMETHING I ATE? 
Jackson S. Davis* 
Abstract: The obesity rate has risen to epidemic proportions in the 
United States. Fast food restaurants have recently come under scrutiny for 
their contribution to the growth of America’s waistlines. Communities 
across the country, recognizing obesity as a issue of serious public health 
concern, are looking for innovative ways to halt the increasing rate of 
obesity. One such method is the use of zoning to exclude fast food restau-
rants entirely, as a matter of public health. Zoning regulations of this type, 
however, may confront challenges under the dormant commerce clause, 
which restricts the power of states to burden interstate commerce. 
Introduction 
 Fast food has been a staple of the American diet for decades.1 The 
abundance of fast food restaurants, though, likely contributes to the 
steadily increasing obesity rate.2 In response, communities are begin-
ning to look to zoning regulations as a means to curb the influence of 
restaurants serving fattening, high-caloric food at great speed and low 
prices.3 Zoning regulations aimed at fast food may also encourage the 
development of healthier alternatives to fast food by altering the built 
environment.4 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007–08. 
1 See Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American 
Meal 6 (2004). Fast food, namely hamburgers and french fries, rose to prominence dur-
ing the 1950s and has become an image of the “quintessential American meal.” Id. Accord-
ing to Schlosser, a “typical American now consumes approximately three hamburgers and 
four orders of french fries every week.” Id. 
2 See id. at 240–41. 
3 See Julie Samia Mair et al., The Ctr. for Law & the Public’s Health, The Use 
of Zoning to Restrict Fast Food Outlets: A Potential Strategy to Combat Obe-
sity 40–53 (2005), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Zoning%20Fast%20Food 
%20Outlets.pdf. The Center for Law and the Public’s Health report provides an in-depth 
look at the variety of ways in which communities have used zoning regulations to restrict 
the operation of fast food restaurants. See id. 
4 See id. at 20; James O. Hill et al., Modifying the Environment to Reverse Obesity, Envtl. 
Health Perspectives, http://www.ehponline.org/docs/2005/7812/7812.pdf (last visited 
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 Local governments enact zoning regulations under the police 
power.5 The police power is the ability of state and local governments 
to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of a community.6 The 
police power was inherited by the states from the English Crown,7 and 
states have delegated it to local governments—through zoning ena-
bling laws—to enact zoning ordinances.8 
 Because zoning laws are local in character, zoning ordinances that 
limit national fast food chains from participating in local markets may 
trigger scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.9 The dormant 
Commerce Clause prohibits state and local governments from placing a 
burden upon interstate commerce.10 Under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, state and municipal laws will be struck down if they are facially 
discriminatory, discriminatory in purpose, or have a discriminatory ef-
fect.11 This Note will address whether a zoning ordinance that excludes 
fast food restaurants from a community, when adopted to reduce obe-
sity rates, would withstand scrutiny under police power and dormant 
Commerce Clause analyses. 
 Part I will address the obesity epidemic in the United States, its 
relationship to fast food, and how communities are responding to this 
growing health crisis. Part II will describe the broad scope of the po-
lice power to regulate for the health, safety, morals, and welfare, as 
well as its relationship to zoning. Part III will cover the evolution of 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and recent cases concerning 
commerce and zoning. Part IV will argue that a fast food zoning ordi-
nance would be upheld under both the police power and dormant 
Commerce Clause analyses. 
                                                                                                                      
Mar. 27, 2008). The built environment refers to the ways in which a community designs 
and constructs its buildings and public spaces. Id. 
5 See Joseph William Singer, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 
§ 11.1.1.1 (3d ed. 2002). 
6 Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Cecily T. Talbert, Curtin’s California Land Use and 
Planning Law 1 (26th ed. 2006). 
7 Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings § 2-2 (3d ed. 2005). 
8 Singer, supra note 5, § 11.1.1.1. 
9 See John M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, “Drawn from Local Knowledge . . . 
And Conformed to Local Wants”: Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 41 (2006). 
10 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles & Policies § 5.3.1 (1997); 
see Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425, 425 n.1 
(1982) (providing a brief history of the term “dormant Commerce Clause”). 
11 See Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause 225–46 (2004). 
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I. Fast Food and Obesity 
 Obesity has risen to epidemic levels throughout the world.12 Re-
cent studies have found that 17.1% of American children and adoles-
cents are overweight, while nearly a third of the adult population, 
32.2%, is obese.13 National data have shown that while overall caloric 
consumption has increased, there has been no corresponding increase 
in physical activity among adults.14 Obesity greatly increases the risk of 
developing many serious medical conditions, including type 2 diabetes, 
atherosclerosis, hypertension, osteoarthritis, metabolic syndrome, sleep 
apnea, and certain forms of cancer.15 The obesity epidemic has turned 
on its head the traditional food-related problem that has plagued hu-
manity throughout its history: starvation.16 The shift from concern for 
insufficient caloric consumption to extreme over consumption is a tes-
tament to the relative economic prosperity of the United States and 
developed nations vis-à-vis the developing world.17 
 “Fast food”18 restaurants have become a focal point in the debate 
over obesity.19 Food at these establishments is generally very high in 
                                                                                                                      
12 World Health Organization, Obesity and Overweight (2003), http://www.who.int/ 
dietphysicalactivity/media/en/gsfs_obesity.pdf. The term “obesity” refers to a body mass 
index of 30 or higher for an adult, while “overweight” refers to a body mass index of be-
tween 25 and 29.9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity: 
Defining Obesity and Overweight, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/defining. 
htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). Body mass index is determined by a person’s height and 
weight, and generally corresponds to the person’s total amount of body fat. Id. 
13 Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Obesity Still a Major Problem (Apr. 14, 
2006), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/06facts/obesity03_04.htm. 
14 Id. 
15 Stanford Hospital & Clinics, Health Effects of Obesity, http://www.stanfordhospi- 
tal.com/clinicsmedServices/default (follow “Bariatric Surgery for Morbid Obesity” hyperlink 
under “Clinics”; then follow “Obesity as a Disease” hyperlink under “Bariatric Surgery”; then 
follow “Health effects of obesity” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). The myriad negative 
health effects of obesity have led to staggering medical costs. See Yum! Brands: Fast Food’s 
Yummy Secret, Economist, Aug. 25, 2005, at 60, 61, available at http://www.economist.com/ 
business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4316138 [hereinafter Yum! Brands]. In 2003 alone, $75 
billion was spent treating obesity-related conditions. Id. Much of this cost is passed on to tax-
payers. Id. 
16 Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 
Geo. L.J. 1361, 1361 (2005). 
17 See id. 
18 Fast food may be defined generally as food that “is designed for ready availability, 
use, or consumption and with little consideration given to quality or significance.” Mer-
riam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 422 (10th ed. 2001). 
19 See Yum! Brands, supra note 15, at 61. See generally Schlosser, supra note 1 (discuss-
ing the impact of the fast food industry on American culture). The idea that fast food out-
lets, such as McDonald’s, Burger King, and Wendy’s, significantly contribute to American 
obesity has permeated throughout popular culture. Super Size Me (Kathbur Pictures 
 
262 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:259 
energy density—the energy content per unit weight—and fat, while 
providing few nutritional benefits.20 Humans have a very limited ability 
to detect energy density, thereby making it difficult to reduce food in-
take when consuming foods with high energy density.21 The high en-
ergy density of fast food thus “challenges our appetite control systems 
with conditions for which they were never designed.”22 A typical meal at 
a fast food restaurant may account for over eighty percent of the rec-
ommended daily allowance for fat, and a single menu item may provide 
nearly half of a day’s total caloric requirements.23 Fast food restaurants 
serve larger portions of food than other restaurants, and even fast food 
portion sizes have drastically increased in the past half century.24 
 The most significant public health concern presented by fast food 
chains may be their ubiquity.25 These establishments can be found on 
practically every major thoroughfare, in both rich and poor communi-
ties.26 Fast food restaurants have even begun to appear within large 
churches known as “megachurches.”27 At these ubiquitous fast food 
                                                                                                                      
2004) (demonstrating the unhealthy effects of eating only meals from McDonald’s over a 
one-month period through an irreverent documentary film). 
20 Mair et al., supra note 3, at 12; A.M. Prentice & S.A. Jebb, Fast Foods, Energy Density 
and Obesity: A Possible Mechanistic Link, 4 Obesity Revs. 187, 187 n.a, 190–91 (2003). For 
instance, a typical meal at McDonald’s—consisting of a Big Mac, large french fries, and 
large Coca-Cola—contains 59 grams of fat, 1420 calories, 75 milligrams of cholesterol, and 
1390 milligrams of sodium. See McDonald’s USA, Nutrition Facts for Popular Menu Items, 
http://www.mcdonalds.com/app_controller.nutrition.index1.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2008). A similar meal at Burger King—consisting of a Whopper, large french fries, and a 
large Coca-Cola—contains 67 grams of fat, 1460 calories, 51 milligrams of cholesterol, and 
1845 milligrams of sodium. See Burger King, U.S. Nutritional Information, http://www.bk. 
com/Nutrition/PDFs/brochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
21 Prentice & Jebb, supra note 20, at 191. 
22 Id. Given the high energy density of foods at many fast food restaurants, “[I]t is vir-
tually impossible to select a combination of items that yield even a moderate energy den-
sity.” Id. 
23 Mair et al., supra note 3, at 12. Figures are based on a 2000-calorie diet. Id. A re-
cent study showed that “children and adolescents aged 4–19 who ate fast food consumed 
on average 187 kilocalories per day more than those who did not, which could theoreti-
cally account for an additional 6 pounds of weight gain per child per year.” Id. 
24 See id. at 10–11. The increase in portion size is noteworthy considering that “people 
tend to eat more when served more.” Id. at 11. 
25 See Schlosser, supra note 1, at 4–5. There has been a tremendous increase in the 
number of fast food restaurants in the past thirty years. Mair et al., supra note 3, at 15. In 
1972, there were only 72,850 fast food restaurants in the country. Id. In recent years, how-
ever, that number has grown to over 280,000. Id. 
26 See Schlosser, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
27 See Dan Thanh Dang, The New Advertising Age: From Eggs to Body Parts, Every Blank 
Space Seems Fair Game as Marketers Strive to Break Through the Clutter, Balt. Sun, Aug. 2, 2006, 
at 1C, available at 2006 WLNR 13342406 (commenting that megachurches are often built 
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outlets, consumers can purchase tasty meals that are both cheaply 
priced and quickly served.28 Perhaps due to the abundance of restau-
rants, people are eating out more; forty percent of food was purchased 
away from home in 1995, and fast food comprised thirty-four percent of 
such purchases in 1997.29 
 While a conclusive link between fast food consumption and the 
obesity rate has yet to be proven, there is a growing belief that envi-
ronmental factors are contributing to the rise in obesity rates.30 The 
planning of communities to include an abundance of fast food restau-
rants may encourage people to be more sedentary.31 Urban design and 
land-use planning can significantly impact levels of physical activity and 
access to healthy food.32 Further, close correlation exists between the 
spread of American-style fast food restaurants and obesity rates around 
the globe.33 As journalist Eric Schlosser has noted, “it seems wherever 
America’s fast food chains go, waistlines start expanding.”34 
                                                                                                                      
with a McDonald’s or Starbucks inside); Sandra Pedicini, Oviedo Church’s Plan Unnerves 
Neighbors, Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 3, 2005, at B1. 
28 Hill et al., supra note 4. Fast food restaurants offer meals that are high in fat and 
sugar, each a relatively low-cost commodity, which allows the restaurants to charge low 
prices while providing super-sized portions. Id. These extremely large portions lead the 
consumer to believe that they are the beneficiaries of a good deal, which in turn may pro-
pel consumers to purchase even more fast food meals. See id.; see also Mair et al., supra 
note 3, at 11 (noting that “offering larger portions for relatively less money has become a 
successful marketing strategy for fast food businesses”). 
29 S.A. French et al., Fast Food Restaurant Use Among Women in the Pound of Prevention 
Study: Dietary, Behavioral and Demographic Correlates, 24 Int’l J. of Obesity 1353, 1353 
(2000); see Mair et al., supra note 3, at 14 (describing the frequency at which at Ameri-
cans consume meals away from home). 
30 Mair et al., supra note 3, at 9. 
31 Hill et al., supra note 4. Restaurants, as well as other businesses such as banks, dry 
cleaners, and pharmacies, commonly offer drive-throughs, reducing activity levels of their 
customers. Id. By contrast, community plans that facilitate walking to businesses and en-
courage a reduced reliance on automobiles may help promote physical activity and lower 
rates of obesity. See id. 
32 See Richard J. Jackson & Chris Kochtitzky, Creating a Healthy Environment: The Impact 
of the Built Environment on Public Health, in Law and the Health System 52, 54–57 (Law-
rence O. Gostin & Peter D. Jacobson eds., 2006); Stephanie Strom, $500 Million Pledged to 
Fight Childhood Obesity, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 2007, at A9 (discussing how children and the 
poor often live in areas with limited healthy dietary options, which poses a significant bar-
rier to choosing healthier lifestyles). 
33 See Schlosser, supra note 1, at 242. For example, the obesity rate among adults and 
the number of fast food restaurants in Great Britain both roughly doubled during the 
same time period, between 1984 and 1993. Id. Additionally, the British are the largest con-
sumers of fast food in western Europe and have the highest rate of obesity. Id. 
34 Id. 
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 Communities around the country are enacting creative solutions 
to this growing public health crisis.35 Some have proposed enacting a 
“fat tax” on unhealthy foods,36 while the New York City Board of Health 
has adopted two regulations aimed at curbing the negative effects of 
fast food consumption.37 The Board first adopted a ban on a particu-
larly unhealthy type of cooking fat, trans fats, often used by the fast 
food industry.38 The Board also approved a requirement for fast food 
outlets to “prominently display the caloric content of each menu item 
on menu boards or near cash registers.”39 
 Other communities have used zoning regulations to exclude fast 
food restaurants from their communities.40 These exclusions can be 
roughly classified as aesthetic-based zoning ordinances, with some 
communities enacting total bans, while others have created density re-
strictions on the number of fast food outlets permitted within a com-
munity.41 Aesthetic zoning regulations ban drive-through restaurants, 
or fast food restaurants generally, in order to preserve the unique and 
aesthetic qualities of a community.42 The town of Concord, Massachu-
setts, for example, has expressly prohibited “[d]rive-in or fast food res-
taurants.”43 Concord justified excluding fast food restaurants as consis-
tent with the stated purposes of its zoning bylaws: to lessen street 
congestion and maintain the “aesthetic qualities of the community.”44 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Manny Fernandez, Pros and Cons of a Zoning Diet: Fighting Obesity by Limiting Fast-
Food Restaurants, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2006, § 1, at 37; Thomas J. Lueck & Kim Severson, 
New York Bans Most Trans Fats in Restaurants, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1. 
36 See Mark Tatge, The Twinkie Tax, Forbes.com, Mar. 3, 2004, http:// 
http://www.forbes.com/taxes/2004/03/02/cz_mt_0302twinkie.html. 
37 Lueck & Severson, supra note 35, at A1. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See Mair et al., supra note 3, at 40–53. While not explicitly tying their zoning regu-
lations to health concerns, these ordinances have the unintended effect of promoting 
public health. See id. at 40. 
41 See id. at 40–53. 
42 See id. at 40–49. 
43 Concord, Mass., Zoning Bylaw § 4.7.1 (2006), available at http://www.concordnet. 
org/Pages/ConcordMA_BOA/zone/2006ZoningBylaw.pdf. Concord’s ordinance defines a 
“drive-in” or “fast food restaurant” as: 
[A]ny establishment whose principal business is the sale of foods or beverages 
in a ready-to-consume state, for consumption within the building or off-
premises, and whose principal method of operation includes: (1) sale of foods 
and beverages in paper, plastic or other disposable containers; or (2) service of 
food and beverages directly to a customer in a motor vehicle. 
Id. 
44 Id. § 1.2. 
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Calistoga, California, is a community that has restricted fast food res-
taurants through a zoning ban on “formula restaurants.”45 The ordi-
nance defines a formula restaurant as having “[s]tandardized menus, 
ingredients, food preparation, uniforms,” as well as similar architec-
ture, logos, business names, or decor of another restaurant located 
elsewhere.46 Calistoga’s City Council objected to formula food busi-
nesses on aesthetic grounds, charging that formula restaurants would 
adversely affect the uniqueness of their community.47 Calistoga’s 
unique character, according to the City Council, is vital to sustaining its 
tourism industry.48 
 While Concord, Calistoga, and other similar communities, have 
regulated fast food outlets out of their communities completely to 
maintain aesthetics, other municipalities are permitting these types of 
businesses with limitations as to the total number and density of fast 
food restaurants.49 Westwood Village, a section of Los Angeles border-
ing the University of California at Los Angeles, has enacted an ordi-
nance limiting streets to one fast food restaurant for every 400 feet of 
lot frontage.50 Arcata, California, on the other hand, has placed a strict 
quota restriction on fast food restaurants.51 In Arcata, no more than 
nine fast food outlets may exist within the community at any time.52 
 Communities have generally predicated their exclusion of fast 
food restaurants on aesthetic grounds.53 A Bronx Councilman, Manuel 
Rivera, however, has recently proposed a similar zoning regulation re-
stricting the number, or location, of fast food restaurants.54 Councilman 
Rivera’s proposal is unique in that his proposal would restrict fast food 
                                                                                                                      
45 Mair et al., supra note 3, at 43; see Calistoga, Cal., Mun. Code § 17.04.616 (2007), 
available at http://nt5.scbbs.com/cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=2844908621&infobase=cal- 
istoga.nfo&jump=17.04.616&softpage=PL_frame#JUMPDEST_17.04.616. 
46 Calistoga, Cal., Mun. Code § 17.04.616, (2007), available at http://nt5.scbbs.com/ 
cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=2844908621&infobase=calistoga.nfo&jump=17.04.616&soft- 
page=PL_frame#JUMPDEST_17.04.616. 
47 Mair et al., supra note 3, at 43–44. 
48 Id. at 44. 
49 See id. at 48–51. 
50 Westwood Village, Cal., Specific Plan § 5.B.4 (2004), available at http://city 
planning.lacity.org/complan/specplan/pdf/wwdvil.pdf. Westwood’s ordinance defines fast 
food restaurants generally, describing them as “establishment[s] which dispense[] pre-
pared food over a counter for consumption on or off the premises, except for a cafeteria.” 
See id. § 4. 
51 Mair et al., supra note 3, at 49. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. at 40–53. 
54 Fernandez, supra note 35, § 1, at 37. 
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restaurants in order to fight chronic obesity.55 Recent reports have 
demonstrated a high level of obesity among New Yorkers.56 Rivera 
hopes to expand the dietary options for those living in low-income 
communities surrounded by countless fast food outlets.57 Currently, no 
municipalities within the United States have enacted zoning regula-
tions excluding fast food restaurants solely as a matter of public 
health.58 Councilman Rivera’s proposal is one of the first to suggest us-
ing zoning laws to directly combat obesity.59 
II. The Police Power to Regulate for Health, Safety, Morals, 
and Welfare 
A. Origin and Scope of the Police Power 
 The police power is the basis for all land-use regulations in the 
United States.60 Broadly, the police power is the capacity of states to 
regulate for the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and wel-
fare.61 The power of the state qua sovereign to regulate for the health, 
safety, morals, and welfare is deeply rooted in English common law.62 
The origins of the police power derive from the nuisance concept that 
a “person may not use his or her property to the detriment of an-
other.”63 Sir William Blackstone likened the police power to domestic 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. Research has indicated that a lack of access to healthy foods may serve as a “sig-
nificant barrier to healthy eating.” Mair et al., supra note 3, at 19. The built environment 
can greatly affect how people eat: 
A built environment that has options for purchasing nutritious foods is more 
conducive to maintaining a healthy weight than one in which the only easily 
accessible options are high calorie, high fat, fast food establishments. In low-
income neighborhoods, fast food may be more available than fresh pro-
duce. . . . [N]eighborhoods with the poorest socioeconomic indicators had 
2.5 times as many fast food outlets as those neighborhoods in the wealthiest 
category. While food consumption is a complex behavior, the built environ-
ment can make it more or less difficult to make healthy choices. 
Wendy C. Perdue et al., Public Health and the Built Environment: Historical, Empirical, and 
Theoretical Foundations for an Expanded Role, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 557, 560 (2003) (foot-
notes omitted). 
58 See Mair et al., supra note 3, at 52–53. 
59 See id.; Fernandez, supra note 35, § 1, at 37. 
60 Curtin, Jr. & Talbert, supra note 6, at 1. 
61 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
62 Eagle, supra note 7, § 2-2 to -3; Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Con-
trols § 35.02 (2006). 
63 Eagle, supra note 7, § 2-1. 
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maintenance of a family, whereby family members are bound to act in 
accordance with good manners and propriety towards one another.64 
The police powers, originally vested in the English crown, succeeded to 
the states following the Revolutionary War.65 
 The Framers of the Constitution clearly intended for the states to 
retain the police powers.66 The police powers were among the powers 
reserved to the states that had not been delegated to the federal gov-
ernment.67 Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland, declared that the po-
lice power “unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the 
States,” and held that the power to force removal of gunpowder fell 
within the ambit of the police power.68 
 The police power has been an elusive, difficult-to-define concept.69 
The U.S. Supreme Court first began to elucidate the scope of the po-
lice power in the landmark cases Munn v. Illinois and Mugler v. Kansas.70 
In Munn, the Court considered the question of whether the Illinois leg-
islature could fix a maximum rate for grain storage within the state.71 
Upholding the regulation, the Court identified broad power for states 
to regulate private property under the police power.72 The Munn Court 
found that Illinois’s statute was a valid assertion of its police power to 
regulate property that affected the public interest.73 Chief Justice Waite 
held that when the use of private property affects public interests there 
is an implicit grant to the public of an interest in such use.74 Waite de-
fined public interests in property as when private property is “used in a 
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect[s] the community 
                                                                                                                      
64 See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *162. 
65 See Eagle, supra note 7, § 2-3. 
66 See The Federalist No. 31, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (W.R. Brock ed., 1970); 
Rohan, supra note 62, § 35.02(2). 
67 Rohan, supra note 62, § 35.02(2); Susan M. Stedfast, Regulatory Takings: A Historical 
Overview and Legal Analysis for Natural Resource Management, 29 Envtl. L. 881, 886 (1999); 
see U.S. Const. amend. X. 
68 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827). The Brown decision was 
also the first time the Supreme Court used the term “police power.” Eagle, supra note 7, 
§ 2-3; see Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 443. 
69 Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of 
American Government 120 (2005). “The police power’s defining characteristic [is] its 
very undefinability. Virtually every definition of the police power [is] accompanied by the 
remark that it cannot be, and has not been, defined.” Id. 
70 Eagle, supra note 7, § 2-3; see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
71 94 U.S. at 123. 
72 See id. at 124–26. 
73 See id. at 126, 130; Stedfast, supra note 67, at 887–88. 
74 Munn, 94 U.S. at 126. 
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at large.”75 He found that the states maintained the general police 
powers “necessary for the common good and the security of life and 
property.”76 These powers were derivative of all the powers possessed by 
the English Parliament.77 Under the police power, states may “regu-
late[] the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner 
in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation be-
comes necessary for the public good.”78 In short, Munn recognized ex-
pansive powers of state governments to regulate the property interests 
of their citizens.79 
 Mugler concerned the constitutionality of a Kansas prohibition 
law.80 The law, an 1880 amendment to the state constitution, prohibited 
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors.81 The act stated that 
businesses selling or manufacturing intoxicating liquors were to be 
considered common nuisances.82 The Court ultimately upheld the con-
stitutionality of the law.83 In its decision, the Court addressed the scope 
and limits of the police power.84 The Mugler Court defined the police 
power as the power to determine whether measures are necessary or 
appropriate to protect the public’s morals, health, or safety.85 The 
Court found that Kansas could exercise the police power to prohibit 
the sale or manufacture of alcohol since the regulation had the appro-
priate motivation of protecting the community from the evils of exces-
sive alcohol consumption.86 The Court effectively deferred to Kansas’s 
decision to protect the community through such an act.87 
 Mugler also carved out instances in which states may not legiti-
mately exercise police powers, even though there is a strong presump-
tion of validity for statutes enacted to promote public health, safety, and 
morals.88 Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, stated that when statutes 
ostensibly adopted to promote legitimate ends of the police power have 
“no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion 
                                                                                                                      
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 124. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 125. 
79 See id. at 124–26. 
80 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 654 (1887). 
81 Id. at 654–55. 
82 Id. at 656. 
83 See id. at 661–62. 
84 See id. at 660–61. 
85 Id. at 661. 
86 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661–62. 
87 See id.; Stedfast, supra note 67, at 889. 
88 See 123 U.S. at 661. 
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of rights secured by the fundamental law,” courts have a duty to strike 
down these laws as being incompatible with the Constitution.89 
 Since the Munn and Mugler decisions, the Court has consistently 
taken an expansive view of the police power.90 Courts in general have 
been very deferential to state and local governmental application of the 
police power.91 In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, petitioner was convicted of vio-
lating a City of Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting anyone from operat-
ing a brickyard within the city limits.92 The Court rejected petitioner’s 
takings and equal protection claims.93 The Court’s opinion, delivered 
by Justice McKenna, demonstrates how deferential the judiciary was 
willing to be with respect to local regulations under the police power.94 
McKenna described the police power as “one of the most essential 
powers of government . . . one that is the least limitable.”95 Accordingly, 
the Hadacheck Court found that police powers were limited only by arbi-
trary, or unjustly discriminatory, application by state or local govern-
ment.96 
 Berman v. Parker interpreted the police power expansively to pro-
mote public welfare.97 Berman concerned the constitutionality of the 
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.98 The Act authorized 
the District of Columbia to acquire property in “blighted areas” 
through the power of eminent domain.99 The Act described the 
blighted areas as “injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and wel-
fare.”100 In order to eliminate the injurious conditions, the Act sought 
to lease or sell the acquired property for redevelopment purposes.101 
Appellants—whose property was a commercial building, not the sort of 
slum housing targeted by the Act—contended that the statute 
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their property.102 Appellants 
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argued that their property was being taken for aesthetic and consis-
tency purposes: “[T]o develop a better balanced, more attractive com-
munity.”103 
 The Court disagreed with appellants, ruling that the Act fell 
within the ambit of the police power.104 The Court adopted a particu-
larly broad police power definition, holding that the traditional uses 
of the police power— “[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace 
and quiet, law and order” —are only illustrative of the wide scope of 
the police power.105 The Court noted that the public welfare was a 
“broad and inclusive” ideal that incorporated a diverse range of con-
cepts, including spiritual, physical, aesthetic, and monetary values.106 
The Court likened a blighted housing area’s effects on the commu-
nity to the ways in which sewage could despoil a river.107 
 In addition to the Court’s expansive view of the police power, Ber-
man demonstrated the Court’s great degree of deference to legislatures 
regulating under the police power.108 The Court declared that it is up 
to the legislatures’ discretion, not the courts’, to decide upon the 
means to be employed when pursuing a legitimate end under the po-
lice power.109 As Justice Douglas explained: 
The definition [of the police power] is essentially the product 
of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of 
government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically ca-
pable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional 
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public inter-
est has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such 
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of 
the public needs to be served by social legislation . . . .110 
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As a result of the Berman decision, once a legislature has identified a 
public welfare purpose under the police power, courts will play a very 
narrow role, heeding the judgment of the legislatures over their own.111 
B. Relationship Between the Police Power and Zoning 
 State governments regulate private property through land-use con-
trols, often enacted at the municipal level.112 Municipalities “have no 
inherent police powers of their own and therefore no inherent power 
to zone.”113 Typically, states will delegate to municipalities—through 
zoning enabling acts—the power to regulate the types of uses and levels 
of usage that are permissible in districts within the municipality.114 
These zoning enabling acts are predicated upon the power to regulate 
for health, safety, and welfare under the police powers.115 Zoning regu-
lations were first enacted “because the common law of nuisance was not 
adequate to deal with modern problems of urbanization and industri-
alization.”116 Zoning is seen as a comprehensive method to defend 
against noxious uses of property.117 
 Zoning laws were first declared constitutional in Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty.118 Euclid serves as “the basis for modern zoning law.”119 At 
issue in Euclid was a 1922 ordinance establishing a comprehensive zon-
ing plan in the village of Euclid, Ohio.120 A property owner harmed by 
the ordinance brought suit under the Fourteenth Amendment.121 The 
property owner had purchased a tract of land, valued at $10,000, to be 
used for industrial purposes.122 At the time of the litigation, the tract 
was a vacant lot waiting to be developed.123 The zoning ordinance lim-
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ited this particular tract to residential uses, thereby significantly reduc-
ing its market value.124 
 The Court upheld the Village’s zoning ordinance.125 Justice Suth-
erland’s opinion employed the language of nuisance law in determin-
ing whether zoning laws are a legitimate exercise of the police power.126 
Justice Sutherland wrote that, much like nuisance, the question of 
whether the police power allows a prohibition on certain uses of prop-
erty via zoning must be determined “in connection with the circum-
stances and the locality.”127 Sutherland found that the Latin maxim 
common in nuisance law, “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,” may be 
instructive when determining the application of the police power.128 He 
went on to note the considerable communal benefits of zoning indus-
trial uses out of the area.129 These benefits included increased home 
safety, reduced traffic, reduced noise levels, and a reduced number of 
street accidents.130 The Court, thus, upheld the constitutionality of the 
zoning ordinance.131 Justice Sutherland concluded that the ordinance 
could not be considered “arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare.”132 In the eighty years that have passed since the Euclid decision, 
courts have consistently found that municipalities may constitutionally 
use their police power to enact zoning regulations.133 
 While there is a presumption of validity for zoning ordinances,134 
the courts have sometimes struck down zoning ordinances found to 
place excessively burdensome restrictions on property.135 In Nectow v. 
City of Cambridge, a landowner challenged a City of Cambridge zoning 
ordinance which would have divided his property into two different 
zones.136 As a result, a 100-foot strip would have been zoned residen-
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tial.137 The Court struck down the ordinance because there could be 
no practical use for this 100-foot strip, and so the health, safety, and 
welfare would not be promoted through such an ordinance.138 
III. The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Police Power 
 The dormant Commerce Clause holds “that state and local laws 
are unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on interstate com-
merce.”139 Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress 
the power to regulate interstate commerce.140 The Constitution itself is 
silent on the issue of whether states can interfere with interstate com-
merce, though it does prohibit states from interfering with foreign 
commerce.141 The courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause to 
have a dormant aspect that limits the ability of states to regulate eco-
nomic activities in which “‘Congress has not affirmatively acted to ei-
ther authorize or forbid the challenged state activity.’”142 The purpose 
behind the dormant Commerce Clause was to eliminate the economi-
cally protectionist state actions that were common prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution.143 As described by Justice Jackson: 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every 
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce 
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market 
in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his ex-
port, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regula-
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tions exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to 
the free competition from every producing area in the Na-
tion to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the 
vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this 
Court which has given it reality.144 
 The concept of the dormant Commerce Clause was first intro-
duced in Gibbons v. Ogden.145 At issue in Gibbons was whether New York 
could grant a steamboat operator the right of exclusive navigation of 
the waters within the state.146 Chief Justice Marshall first described 
commerce as including not merely the exchange of commodities, but 
“commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations.”147 
Marshall found that steamboat navigation fell within the definition of 
commerce.148 He concluded that the Commerce Clause was a limit on 
the power of the states.149 The Court held that “when a State proceeds 
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several 
States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is 
doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.”150 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, thus, established interstate commerce as a realm in which 
Congress had supreme authority and that the states could not encroach 
upon.151 He did, however, leave open the door for the limited intersec-
tion of state and federal powers over commerce when states are exercis-
ing their police power function, namely for “[i]nspection laws, quaran-
tine laws, [or] health laws of every description.”152 
 Since the ruling in Gibbons, the Court has had great difficulty de-
ciding the difficult question of whether a state law is unduly burdening 
interstate commerce or is a valid use of the police power.153 The Su-
preme Court has utilized several different schema for addressing the 
fine line between the police power and the dormant Commerce 
Clause.154 The first approach, devised in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, at-
tempted to determine whether a particular subject area being regu-
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lated by a state required a uniform, national approach or necessitated a 
local level of legislation.155 The analytical framework of Cooley proved to 
be a problematic solution that raised a number of new questions.156 For 
example, under the Cooley approach, protectionist state legislation that 
greatly affected interstate commerce was allowable if it was considered a 
local action.157 Additionally, the Cooley decision failed to address the 
distinction between national and local legislation.158 
 In Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, the Court adopted a new approach for 
dormant Commerce Clause cases.159 Justice Butler’s opinion held that 
a state law that “directly interferes with or burdens foreign commerce 
is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with 
which it was passed.”160 By implication, state statutes that had only an 
indirect effect on interstate commerce were deemed valid under Di 
Santo.161 The Di Santo test was difficult to apply in practice.162 It was 
often unclear whether a state law was directly or indirectly affecting 
commerce through its regulations.163 
 The modern dormant Commerce Clause approach has aban-
doned the rigid, bright-line tests of Cooley and Di Santo in favor of a 
more flexible approach: “State regulation affecting interstate com-
merce will be upheld if (a) the regulation is rationally related to a le-
gitimate state end, and (b) the regulatory burden imposed on inter-
state commerce, and any discrimination against it, are outweighed by 
the state interest in enforcing the regulation.”164 In this dual-part ana-
lytical framework, the initial question is whether the legislation is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state end.165 At the heart of the modern 
approach, however, is the next question: whether the state or local leg-
islation is facially discriminatory.166 That is, the question is “whether a 
state law discriminates against out-of-staters or whether it treats all alike 
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regardless of residence.”167 Discriminatory laws are subject to a “virtu-
ally per se rule of invalidity.”168 The Court has declared that it will em-
ploy the “strictest scrutiny” in facially discriminatory cases.169 A dis-
criminatory law “will be upheld only if it is proven that the law is 
necessary to achieve an important government purpose.”170 State laws 
may also violate the dormant Commerce Clause with statutes that are 
facially neutral with respect to out-of-staters, but have a discriminatory 
effect or a discriminatory purpose.171 
 Even where a state law is not facially discriminatory, or discrimina-
tory in effect or purpose, the courts have found that they can nonethe-
less run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.172 The courts have 
striven to shield the national economic market from nondiscriminatory 
state laws that place an undue burden on interstate commerce.173 In 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Court devised a balancing test to deal with 
the issue of nondiscriminatory state laws affecting commerce.174 The 
Pike Court found that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”175 In other words, if the burdens a state law places on 
interstate commerce outweigh the benefits, the law will be struck 
down.176 This balancing test provides the courts with a great deal of dis-
cretion in their analysis of nondiscriminatory dormant Commerce 
Clause cases.177 Unlike facially discriminatory laws, nondiscriminatory 
laws are generally upheld by the courts.178 
 The Pike balancing approach has led to a great deal of confusion 
over what constitutes a discriminatory effect under the dormant Com-
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merce Clause.179 Two cases in particular, Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., best il-
lustrate this confusion.180 In Hunt, North Carolina enacted a statute 
requiring all containers of apples shipped into or sold in the state to 
bear a U.S. Department of Agriculture grading system or no grade at 
all.181 The statute explicitly prohibited state grading systems.182 Wash-
ington State—the largest producer of apples in the United States— 
used its own extensive, industry-accepted grading system for apples and 
brought suit claiming that North Carolina’s statute was an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce.183 The Court found that North 
Carolina’s facially neutral statute had a discriminatory effect on inter-
state commerce.184 The statute raised the costs for Washington produc-
ers doing business in North Carolina, stripped away Washington’s com-
petitive advantage stemming from its rigorous grading system, and 
“insidiously operate[d] to the advantage of local apple producers.”185 
The Court found that the ostensible benefits of the statute—consumer 
protection—far outweighed the burdens on commerce.186 The Court 
noted that any desire to protect consumers through apple grading was 
undermined by the terms of the statute because the statute permitted 
apples with no grade label whatsoever, depriving consumers of infor-
mation about apple quality.187 
 Though factually similar to Hunt, in Clover Leaf the Court upheld a 
Minnesota statute as having only incidental burdens on interstate 
commerce.188 Clover Leaf concerned a Minnesota statute banning the 
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“retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers,” 
while allowing the sale of nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers of a 
material other than plastic, such as paperboard.189 Upholding the stat-
ute, Justice Brennan first found that the act was not facially discrimina-
tory in that it regulated all retailers without consideration of whether 
the milk containers were produced in-state or out-of-state.190 Applying 
the Pike balancing test, Justice Brennan concluded that the burdens 
imposed on interstate commerce were “relatively minor” compared to 
the environmental benefits created by the statute.191 Although Minne-
sota had a substantial pulpwood industry, which would benefit signifi-
cantly from the statute, and no plastics industry, which would hurt only 
out-of-state firms, the Court nonetheless found that “[a] nondiscrimi-
natory regulation serving substantial state purposes is not invalid simply 
because it causes some business to shift from a predominately out-of-
state industry to a predominately in-state industry. Only if the burden 
on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State’s legitimate pur-
poses does such a regulation violate the Commerce Clause.”192 
 The results of Hunt and Clover Leaf are seemingly contradictory: 
each involves a facially neutral law, apparently adopted for a legiti-
mate purpose, which had discriminatory effects on interstate com-
merce.193 However, in only one case, Hunt, was the law struck down.194 
The different outcomes have been explained by noting that there was 
some evidence of a discriminatory intent by North Carolina in enact-
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ing its statute, whereas Minnesota’s intentions were not deemed to be 
discriminatory.195 Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky has said 
that laws will likely be found to have a discriminatory effect if they ex-
clude all out-of-staters from a certain market within the state, place 
costs on out-of-staters that are not borne by in-staters as well, or are 
motivated by economic protectionism.196 
 The Supreme Court has yet to apply its dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis to zoning regulations.197 In recent years, a number of 
zoning decisions with dormant Commerce Clause implications have be-
gun to appear in federal circuit and district courts.198 The courts have 
upheld these zoning regulations, finding that they do not impermissi-
bly burden interstate commerce.199 In Georgia Manufactured Housing 
Ass’n v. Spalding County, Spalding County amended its zoning ordi-
nance to require that manufactured (mobile) homes have a certain 
roof pitch.200 The district court held that the roof pitch requirement 
caused problems for housing manufacturers, both in and out of Geor-
gia, and increased costs for members of the housing industry.201 Revers-
ing the district court’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the zoning regulation did not impermissibly 
burden interstate commerce because the costs imposed were the same 
for both in-state and out-of-state manufacturers.202 
 In a similar case, Texas Manufacturing Housing Ass’n v. City of Neder-
land, the City of Nederland denied a lot owner a permit to install a 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development HUD-code 
manufactured home on his property, determining the manufactured 
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home was a “trailer coach.”203 Nederland’s zoning ordinance prohib-
ited trailer coaches on any lot except within trailer parks.204 Plaintiff 
contended that HUD-code manufactured housing was an out-of-state 
interest, as many are built outside Texas and imported into the state, 
that was impermissibly burdened by the zoning ordinance.205 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirming the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment, found that the zoning ordinance bur-
dened in-state and out-of-state interests equally and that plaintiff had 
not shown that in-state businesses will supply housing instead of HUD-
code manufactured housing.206 
IV. Fast Food Zoning Ordinances Would Be Upheld Under Police 
Power and Dormant Commerce Clause Analyses 
 Fast food zoning ordinances would likely be a valid application of a 
local government’s police power.207 In addition, such ordinances would 
not have discriminatory effects under the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. bal-
ancing approach to the dormant Commerce Clause.208 
 The use of zoning ordinances to exclude fast food restaurants— 
with the promotion of public health as the sole justification—would be 
a permissible application of the police power by a municipality.209 Obe-
sity rates in the United States have risen dramatically in the past half 
century.210 The obesity rate in the United States is, at present, higher 
than any other industrialized country.211 The obesity rate for U.S. adults 
has doubled since the early 1960s, while the childhood obesity rate has 
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also doubled since the late 1970s.212 In total, around forty-four million 
adults are obese, while six million are “super-obese.”213 
 This level of obesity can lead to a variety of life-threatening medi-
cal conditions such as heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes.214 
Obesity places a significant strain on the U.S. health care system.215 
Obesity has an impact on direct health care costs for preventive, diag-
nostic, and treatment services, as well as indirect costs relating to mor-
bidity and mortality.216 
 Recent research has suggested that the built environment may 
have a strong impact on obesity.217 Much of the American landscape 
provides a bounty of “inexpensive, high-energy, good-tasting food that 
is available continuously throughout the day.”218 This landscape, when 
combined with increasingly sedentary lifestyles, has contributed to the 
gradual increase in obesity.219 One of the most important ways in 
which the growing tide of obesity can be stopped is to create built en-
vironments that promote healthier lifestyle choices.220 Alternatives to 
fast food within a community, such as supermarkets or grocery stores, 
tend to increase consumption of healthier foods, as they typically of-
fer more nutritious food at lower prices than fast food restaurants.221 
 A zoning ordinance excluding fast food restaurants as a matter of 
public health would fall within the purview of a municipality’s police 
power.222 As stated in Berman v. Parker, the uses of the police power for 
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the public welfare is a “broad and inclusive” concept.223 Moreover, the 
police power has long been explicitly tied to a notion of public 
health.224 Local governments have a clear public interest in reducing or 
eliminating restaurants that may be significant contributors to a life-
threatening condition: obesity.225 
 The Supreme Court has plainly stated its preference for deferring 
to the judgment of legislative bodies in police power cases.226 If a com-
munity were to enact a fast food zoning ordinance on public health 
grounds, a court would likely defer to the municipality’s discretion as to 
the means employed to reach the legitimate end of reducing public 
obesity.227 Thus, fast food zoning would likely be upheld as a valid exer-
cise of the police power even if there are other available obesity-
reducing options.228 The use of the police power, the “least limitable” of 
governmental powers,229 would only be struck down if it had no sub-
stantial relation to public health.230 A fast food zoning ordinance en-
acted to combat obesity, would almost certainly be upheld under the 
discretionary standard employed in police power cases.231 
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 While fast food zoning would likely survive police power analysis, 
it may nonetheless face a challenge under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.232 The first step in any dormant Commerce Clause analysis is 
to determine whether the state action is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state end.233 The Court has consistently held that legislation en-
acted by a state or municipality under the police power, such as a zon-
ing ordinance, is rationally related to a legitimate state end.234 The 
next step, then, is to determine whether under the Pike balancing test 
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by a fast food zoning 
ordinance would outweigh its purported benefits.235 
 As issues of local concern with potential national implications, zon-
ing regulations are beginning to emerge as an important subject matter 
in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.236 The Supreme Court 
will likely chose to address the issue of zoning and the dormant Com-
merce Clause as more communities begin to use zoning to achieve such 
goals as preserving local character or curbing the obesity epidemic.237 A 
fast food zoning ordinance would be a governmental action in re-
sponse to a national obesity problem that was reflective of a commu-
nity’s needs and values.238 A zoning regulation, by its very nature, af-
fects commercial interests in that it can place conditions on which 
commercial uses are permissible on a particular parcel; thus, zoning 
regulations have the potential to raise barriers to interstate commerce, 
implicating the dormant Commerce Clause.239 
 Fast food restaurants are typically either part of a national restau-
rant chain or a franchise of such a national chain.240 They are enor-
mous enterprises in terms of both their sheer numbers and net prof-
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its.241 As commercial enterprises, they are participating in practically 
every local market in the country.242 A fast food zoning ordinance 
would effectively prevent major national commercial actors from par-
ticipating in local markets, which would have an indirect effect on in-
terstate commerce.243 A fast food zoning ordinance could be seen as 
promoting local restaurants at the expense of out-of-state fast food 
chains. 244 Fast food chains could argue that municipalities are moti-
vated by economic protectionism, with any benefits to public health as 
a subterfuge to avoid invalidity under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.245 Out-of-state restaurant chains may also contend that the bur-
dens imposed on interstate commerce far outweigh the benefits to pub-
lic health, arguing that the connection between obesity and the built 
environment are tenuous.246 The narrowly local concern of a fast food 
zoning ordinance—protecting a community’s health—would render it 
susceptible to a challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause.247 
 Though a fast food zoning ordinance may be vulnerable under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, such an ordinance would likely survive 
under the Pike balancing test employed in Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Commission, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., and other cases.248 
Most significantly, zoning ordinances to improve public health by ex-
cluding fast food restaurants would not have a discriminatory intent.249 
A fast food zoning ordinance’s primary aim would be to reduce un-
healthy food options within a community and promote healthier life-
styles in the face of an obesity epidemic.250 Moreover, economic protec-
tionism, one of the rationales behind the dormant Commerce Clause, 
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would not be a motivating force behind a fast food zoning ordinance.251 
All burdens placed on interstate commerce would be incidental to the 
overriding goal of changing the built environment to promote health-
ier lifestyles.252 
 For instance, suppose a hypothetical city, Clarksville, enacted a 
zoning ordinance that prohibited restaurants primarily serving ready-
to-consume foods in paper, plastic, or other disposable containers for 
consumption on or off premises, as well as restaurants directly serving 
food to customers in motor vehicles.253 Clarksville’s legislature justified 
the use restriction as necessary to protect the health and welfare of its 
citizens through healthier dietary options.254 Clarksville’s hypothetical 
ordinance would not be driven by an intent to protect the local restau-
rant industry, though surely national fast food chains would be ham-
pered in their ability to open new restaurants within that particular 
zone.255 Further, such a fast food zoning ordinance would not impose 
costs on out-of-staters not borne by in-staters.256 Clarksville’s ordinance 
would affect locally owned fast food restaurants the same as out-of-state 
fast food restaurants in that both would be expressly prohibited within 
the zone.257 The costs imposed on local purveyors—the prohibition of 
a certain type of restaurant—would be equal to those of out-of-state 
chains.258 In-state restaurants would be barred from operating in the 
fast food mode—a harm proportional to that of any out-of-state enter-
prise.259 Since fast food is a national enterprise, dominated by large 
corporations likely to be out-of-state, Clarksville’s ordinance logically 
would have a far greater impact on out-of-staters.260 Because of this dis-
parity in impact, more business could potentially shift to local restaura-
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teurs filling the gap created by an exclusionary fast food ordinance.261 
However, under Clover Leaf, facially nondiscriminatory regulations serv-
ing legitimate purposes do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause 
merely for shifting business to in-state enterprises.262 Local action will 
only violate the dormant Commerce Clause when the burden clearly 
outweighs the legitimate purposes behind the action.263 Courts have 
consistently found that legislative action resulting in a shift towards in-
state business does not render the action void under the Pike balancing 
approach.264 
 The Clarksville ordinance also would not exclude out-of-state 
chains from operating within the local restaurant market.265 A national 
chain would not be entirely barred from operating a restaurant in 
Clarksville, rather they would be prohibited from operating a particular 
subset of the restaurant industry.266 The Supreme Court has held that 
there is no constitutionally protected right to operate a particular mode 
of business.267 It is the interstate market, rather than any particular 
businesses, that is protected from burdens on interstate commerce.268 
Clarksville’s hypothetical ordinance would not exclude all out-of-staters 
from their local market.269 Out-of-state fast food chains, as well as local 
fast food restaurants, would be free to operate any other type of restau-
rant within Clarksville.270 In fact, many of the national fast food chains, 
such as McDonald’s and Wendy’s, are beginning to acquire and operate 
secondary restaurant chains that might avoid being classified as fast 
food restaurants.271 Major chains may thereby retain their competitive 
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advantage in the restaurant industry and continue to operate within 
municipalities adopting fast food zoning ordinances.272 
 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions con-
cerning zoning and the dormant Commerce Clause support the claim 
that a fast food zoning ordinance would be upheld.273 Fast food zoning 
would be akin to both the zoning ordinances at issue in Georgia Manu-
factured Housing Ass’n v. Spalding County and Texas Manufactured Housing 
Ass’n v. City of Nederland.274 In each case, zoning ordinances were in 
place that arguably discriminated against out-of-state manufactured 
home producers in favor “of the site-built home market, which, by its 
very nature, is local and therefore strictly in-state.”275 The courts re-
jected the notion that these zoning ordinances violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause, finding that the burdens were the same for both in-
state and out-of-state businesses and that the claimants had not demon-
strated that housing in the place of manufactured homes would be 
provided by in-state actors.276 While restaurants similarly operate to fill 
the food needs of a local community, restaurants are even less strictly 
in-state actors, as the restaurant industry is far more conducive to being 
managed by out-of-state corporations than on-site home construc-
tion.277 Accordingly, a fast food zoning ordinance would favor in-state 
business even less than the zoning ordinances that were challenged on 
the basis of discriminating against out-of-state business and upheld in 
Georgia Manufactured Housing Ass’n and Texas Manufactured Housing 
Ass’n.278 As such, a fast food zoning ordinance would likely be upheld 
under the dormant Commerce Clause because any burden imposed on 
interstate commerce would not be clearly excessive relative to the local 
benefits.279 
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Conclusion 
 A fast food zoning ordinance, predicated on public health 
grounds, would likely be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. 
Fast food zoning would serve the legitimate state purpose of reducing 
the alarmingly high obesity rate in the United States. As a legitimate 
exercise of the police power to zone for the health, safety, and welfare, 
a zoning ordinance of this type would likely withstand a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge. The burdens on interstate commerce 
would not be excessive in relation to the local benefits. A fast food zon-
ing ordinance would not be motivated by economic protectionism, 
place costs on out-of-state interests not borne by in-state interests, or 
exclude out-of-state actors from a certain market. 
 The obesity epidemic has significantly strained the nation’s health-
care system. A change in the built environment, facilitated by zoning 
ordinances, could alter the landscape in our communities and result in 
more active, healthier lifestyles. Communities should be encouraged to 
enact creative solutions to a growing problem that has no end in sight. 
